The Bench & Bar magazine is published to provide members of the KBA with information that will increase their knowledge of the law, improve the practice of law, and assist in improving the quality of legal services for the citizenry.
Issue link: https://kentuckybenchandbar.epubxp.com/i/245872
An additional controversial legal issue presented in Windsor was the question of standing. As mentioned previously, the Obama Administration issued a Section 530D notice to the speaker of the House of Representatives, stating that the United States would no longer defend the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act. In the United States' brief on the merits, the Justice Department asked that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' determination that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional be upheld. Both actions signaled that the interests of the original plaintiff and the original defendant were now wholly aligned, suggesting that no actual case or controversy existed. To resolve this standing issue, the majority drew a distinction between the legal requirements for Article III standing – (1) injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood that injury will be redressed by a favorable decision10 – and the rules of prudential standing, which the Court deemed to be "essentially matters of judicial selfgovernance."11 The Court concluded that the legal requirements for Article III standing were satisfied because the United States had a real interest in the proceedings before the Court – namely, affirmance of the Second Circuit's judgment would require that the United States Treasury refund the estate tax paid, which would be a "real and immediate economic injury."12 The Court likened the executive branch's continued enforcement of the statute (despite the executive branch's opinion that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional) to the facts presented in INS v. Chadha.13 The Court concluded that, so long as the party requesting relief retains some stake in the appeal, that party maintains standing to appeal the lower court's decision and the requirements of Article III are met.14 Though the Court also noted that the Executive's position The Chief Justice's separate dissent predominantly conveyed two messages. First, in his opinion, the Defense of Marriage Act was a constitutional act of Congress because Congress had an interest in uniformity and stability. Second, the Chief Justice wrote that the majority had effectively limited its analysis to Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act and provided further insulation for Section 2 of the Act by relying, at least in part, on principles of federalism.18 Justice Scalia offered a particularly scathing dissent, chock full of rhetorical questions, in which he contended that (1) a justiciable case or controversy did not exist; and (2) it is not always the Supreme Court's role to determine "all constitutional questions" "when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution."19 Scalia maintained that the determination of whether a statute infringes on the Constitution is ancillary – purely "by accident" – to resolving a dispute otherwise properly before the Court.20 As to whether a justiciable case or controversy existed, Scalia claimed that Article III requires "a plaintiff (or appellant) who has standing to complain [and] an opposing party who denies the validity of the complaint."21 Because Windsor's injury was cured by the District Court, and the executive branch did not ask the appellate courts to reverse the ruling, Scalia concluded that no case or controversy existed, and therefore, Article III standing requirements were not met. Despite his allegation that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case, Justice Scalia took his turn to pass upon the merits of the case as well. Justice Scalia concluded that the Defense of Marriage Act was enacted for legitimate reasons, one of which was to settle potentially difficult conflict of laws questions related to the status and validity of a homosexual couple's marriage for federal purposes.22 Further, Scalia argued that the act allowed Congress to make determinations about policies it wanted to encourage, which was supposedly evidenced by providing "a special estate-tax exemption . . . [for] only opposite-sex spouses."23 Justice Alito also penned a dissenting opinion in which he challenged the merits of the majority's findings, but agreed that standing was present. 5 IAGE EQUALITY in the case could result in a "friendly, nonadversary, proceeding" instead of a "real, earnest and vital controversy," the Court concluded that the appointment of an amici curiae to fully develop the record and ensure the adversarial presentation of the issues was sufficient to satisfy the prudential requirements.15 Further, the Court stated that, even though concerns related to prudential standing may exist, the Court should issue an opinion on the merits because otherwise (1) there would be a lack of precedent for lower courts to follow; (2) hundreds of thousands of people would be subjected to continuing discrimination; and (3) courts would have to entertain extensive litigation.16 Given all of the foregoing, the Court determined that the case was justiciable and that sufficient standing existed to enable the Court to reach the merits of the case. Six justices, including one dissenting justice, agreed that standing did exist in this case.17 B&B; • 1.14