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missal of a pro se plaintiff's lawsuit against Jefferson County for failure to state a claim. 28 The plaintiff sought to recover mil- lions in damages for losses he allegedly suf- fered during previous litigation in the Jef- ferson County courts. He alleged "judicial negligence" and other claims. The Court of Appeals concluded that none of the plaintiff's "listed grievances" was a "proper cause of action" and that the plaintiff had not set forth any facts "upon which a cause of action can be ascertained." 29 In Espinosa, the Court of Appeals had this to say about Twombly: The Supreme Court of the United States recently discussed the thresh- old requirements of notice pleading, observing that even though the facts do not have to be detailed, they must be fundamentally adequate to provide at least a modicum of notice as the cause of action[.] 30 The Court then quoted the following language from Twombly with approval: A plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recita- tion of the elements of a cause of ac- tion will not do…. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. 31 The Court did not focus on the plausibility language in Twombly, nor did it note that the U.S. Supreme Court had raised the bar for pleading under the federal rules. Plain- tiff Espinosa's complaint was apparently so deficient that the Court had no need to consider those issues. SUMMARY Twombly and Iqbal have made waves in the federal courts. So far, however, they have not left a ripple in the Kentucky state courts, and courts and practitioners continue to operate under the familiar standards. As the authors of Kentucky Practice have put it, "most Kentucky practitioners will continue to assume (perhaps safely) that the traditional, notice-pleading, 'no-set-of-facts' standard pertains to actions pled in Kentucky state courts." 32 Federal district courts in Kentucky have noted that the standard for pleading is more lenient in the Kentucky state courts than in federal court. 33 Kentucky courts frequently rely on federal caselaw when interpreting a Kentucky rule of procedure that is similar to its federal counterpart. 34 However, Kentucky courts do not always follow the federal courts' lead. It remains to be seen whether "plausibility pleading" will turn out to be one of those areas in which the Kentucky courts diverge from the federal courts. No Kentucky appellate court has yet addressed that question. PRACTICE POINTERS As the authors of Kentucky Practice caution, and rightly so, "no Kentucky practitioner would want to be the first lawyer to lose a state-court case on this point." 35 Where possible, it may be better to be safe than to risk being sorry, and to satisfy the plausibility standard for pleading claims in state court cases. This suggestion applies particularly to cases filed in Kentucky state court that are subject to removal to federal court. Generally speaking, in cases that are removed to federal court, the district court evaluates the sufficiency of the pleading under the federal standard (that is, plausibility pleading) rather than under the more lenient Kentucky standard. 36 A complaint that would pass muster in state court may well be dismissed in federal court. Indeed, federal courts applying Twombly and Iqbal have granted motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in cases removed from the Kentucky state courts. 37 Any Kentucky attorney drafting a complaint to be filed in state court in a case where grounds exist for removal to federal court would be wise to plead, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in Twombly, "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 38 E. Kenly Ames is a part- ner at English, Lucas, Priest & Owsley, LLP, in Bowling Green. Her prac- tice focuses on litigation, arbitration and counsel- ing relating to business disputes, with an empha- sis on trademark, copy- right, trade secret and non-competition matters. Ames graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1991 and then from Columbia University Law School in 1994. She was a member of the Columbia Law Review. After law school, Ames was a law clerk to the Honorable William C. Conner of the United States District Court for the South- ern District of New York. She then joined Choate, Hall & Stewart in Boston, where she practiced in the litigation department and the intellectual property litigation group. She also spent six months as a specially-appointed as- sistant district attorney in Boston. In 2002, she moved to Bowling Green and joined English, Lucas, Priest & Owsley. 1 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 2 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 3 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 4 Id. at 45-46. 5 See The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1767, 1771 (2014). 6 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. 7 Id. at 570. 8 Id. at 558 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)). 9 Id. at 560. 10 See 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1772. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. 12 Id. at 678. 13 Id. at 679. 14 Id. at 678-79. 15 Id. at 679. 16 Per Westlaw searches performed on June 8, 2015. 17 Per Westlaw searches performed on June 8, 2015. 18 See, e.g., Keep Calm and Plead On: Why New Empirical Evidence Should Temper Fears About Pleading Plausibility, 44 Seton Hall L. Rev. 247, 257-60 (2014). 19 Id. at 275-76. 20 Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carney- han, 169 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ky. 2005). 21 Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (inter- nal quotations omitted). 22 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Coldstream Labs., Inc., 337 S.W.3d 642, 645 (Ky. App. 2010); Buckminster v. Boland, 2011 WL 4861860, at *2 (Ky. App. Oct. 14, 2011). 23 See, e.g., Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union of Ky., Local 541 v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977). 24 6 Ky. Practice, Rule 12.02, Heading 9. 25 Per Westlaw searches performed on June 8, 2015. 26 Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 7. 27 Beckhart v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 3525107, at *2, *4 (Ky. Ct. App. June 5, 2015); see also Harrell v. Unifund CCR Partners, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 495294, at *2 (Ky. App. Feb. 6, 2015) (motion for discre- tionary review pending). 28 2009 WL 277488 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2009). 29 Id. 30 Id. at *1. 31 Id. 32 6 Ky. Practice, Rule 8.01, Heading 1. 33 E.g., Tucker v. Heaton, 2015 WL 1884384, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 24, 2015); Combs v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 934 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923 (E.D. Ky. 2013) ("Because Kentucky's pleading standard is more lenient than the federal rules, which standard ap- plies matters …."). 34 Curtis Green & Clay Green, Inc. v. Clark, 318 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Ky. App. 2010). 35 6 Ky. Practice, Rule 8.01, Heading 1. 36 Tucker, 2015 WL 1884384, at *2-*3; Vanhook v. Somerset Health Facilities, LP , 67 F. Supp. 3d 810, 814-17 (E.D. Ky. 2014). 37 E.g., Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 2015 WL 1980215, at *3, *13 (W.D. Ky. May 1, 2015); Watkins v. FBI, 2015 WL 339584, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 23, 2015); United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Air Transport Int'l LLC, 2013 WL 2180788, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 20, 2013). 38 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 27 B&B; • 7.15